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Maxfield: Constitutional Law - Is the Current Test of the Constitutionality

CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Is the Current Test of the Constitutionality of
Capital Punishment Proper? Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo.
1981).

Mark Hopkinson became involved in two legal disputes
in 1975. In both cases, counsel for the opposing party was
Vincent Vehar. On August 6, 1977, Hopkinson directed an
accomplice to place a bomb in the basement of the Vehar
family home. Early the next morning this order was carried
out and the resulting explosion killed Vehar, as well as his
wife and son.
In July of 1978, Jeff Green, a former friend and
employee of Hopkinson, disclosed to law enforcement officials Hopkinson's role in the Vehar murders and other
crimes. With the aid of Green's testimony and before the
trial of the Vehar murders, Hopkinson was convicted on
federal charges regarding the interstate transportation of
a bomb and was sentenced to the federal minimum security
facility at Lompoc, California. While in prison, Hopkinson
arranged by telephone for the murder of Green. Green was
subsequently murdered by unknown individuals. On May
20, 1979, two days before the scheduled commencement of
the grand jury investigation into the Vehar bombing, Green's
body was discovered. Green had apparently been tortured
prior to his death.
Hopkinson was tried by a jury and convicted on four
counts of first-degree murder and two counts of conspiracy.'
The trial judge, upon recommendation by the jury,' sentenced him to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment
for the Vehar murders and to death for the murder of Jeff
Green.3 On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed
the convictions and held that the death penalty was not
per se unconstitutional. 4 Because the case was remanded for
resentencing due to a technical error in the jury instructions,' the court did not reach the question of whether
Copyright@ 1982 by the University of Wyoming

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 88 (Wyo. 1981).
WYO. STAT. § 6-4-102 (1977).
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 97.
Id. at 172, 150-52.
Id. at 172. An improper wording of the instruction on the verdict form
which was submitted to the jury invalidated the imposition of the death
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Wyoming's capital sentencing statutes were properly applied.
This note will survey the United States Supreme Court
cases which have been instrumental in formulating the
present day law on capital punishment. The salient features
of Wyoming's recently enacted death penalty statutes will
also be discussed. Attention will then turn to Hopkinson,
with primary emphasis upon: 1) the adoption by the
Hopkinson court, for purposes of the Wyoming Constitution, of the U.S. Supreme Court's three-pronged test of the
constitutionality of capital punishment, and 2) the guidelines set out by the court which are designed to facilitate
future application of Wyoming's death penalty statutes.
Finally, the constitutional test itself will be the subject of
focus. The author will argue that the current test is improper and propose a new one in its place.
MOLDING THE TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

Channelling the Sentencer's Discretion:
Prior to 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States
had never addressed the question of whether the death
penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment. When
this delicate issue was finally confronted in Furman v.
Georgia, the Court was constrained to a one-paragraph per
curiam opinion followed by five separate concurring and
four dissenting opinions.' Despite the sharp division among
the justices, the per curiam holding in Furman marks one
of the cornerstones in the evolving test of the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes. The Court held that
"as applied" under the Georgia statute, capital punishment
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.' More importantly, however, it did not rule that capital punishment
was per se unconstitutional.
sentence. The jury was instructed that the death penalty could be properly
imposed if they found, inter alia, that "at the time of murder: . . . The
Defendant was previously convicted of another murder in the first degree
or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person." Id. at
'
167, 170 (emphasis in original).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. Id. at 239-40.
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Furman stands for the proposition that the penalty of
death may not be imposed under arbitrary and capricious
sentencing procedures.8 The sentencing authority's discretion
must be directed so as to avoid imposition of the death
penalty in a purely "hit or miss" fashion. As stated by
Justice Stewart, "[the death sentence under review in
Furman is] cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."9 Thus, out of
Furman, arose a concept that an individual's constitutional
rights are infringed upon when he is punished more severely
than others whose crimes are equally reprehensible.
After Furman, the legislatures in thirty-five states,
including Wyoming, scrambled to revise their capital punishment statutes.1" In Gregg v. Georgia and its four companion cases, the Court was called upon to pass on the facial
validity and application of five of these newly adopted sentencing procedures. 1 Again the Court fractured, with the
centrist plurality of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens dictating
2
the result in each case.'
These three justices reaffirmed the notion that the
death penalty is not unconstitutional under all circumstances." They subjected the five statutes under review to
a three-prong test which would permit infliction of the
death penalty only if it was 1) consistent with contemporary
values, 2) in accord with the "dignity of man"' 4 and 3)
imposed under sentencing procedures which provided specific
objective standards to guide the jury's decisionmaking process.' 5 The first two prongs determine whether capital punishment for the crime of murder is per se unconstitutional.
6
The third prong is a product of Furman."
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980).
Furman v. Georgia, supra note 6, at 309.
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 150.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) ; Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) ; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
428 U.S. at 158, 244, 264, 282, 327.
Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 169.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 189.
Id.
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After reviewing what it termed "objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction,"'" the
Gregg Court held that the death penalty is acceptable to
contemporary society.18 It relied heavily on the fact that 35
states had enacted new death penalty statutes in the four
years since Furman. 19 Juries were also considered a valid
barometer of contemporary values."0 The Court, however,
discounted the fact that in recent decades juries had been
increasingly reluctant to impose the death sentence.2 ' It
concluded this trend might well be a reflection of the "humane feeling" that this most irrevocable of sanctions should
be reserved for a small number of cases. The dignity of man concept requires that the penalty
not be excessive. The burden of proof on the issue of excessiveness, however, rests with the defendant who must overcome the presumption in favor of the sanction's validity."3
Appellant Gregg did not sustain this "heavy burden" of
proving that death was excessive punishment and therefore
the Court concluded capital punishment was in accord with
the dignity of man concept.24 The inquiry into excessiveness
had two aspects: First, whether the punishment involved
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and second,
whether the punishment was grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime. 5
Under the Gregg analysis, a penalty does not result in
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain merely because
a less severe sanction is sufficient to serve the ends of penology. To prevail, the defendant must show"8 that the sanction imposed is so totally without penological justification
that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering. 7
The State of Georgia argued that capital punishment was
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 173.
Id. at 179-82.
Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 183.
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justified because it served two purposes: retribution and
deterrence."3 The Court ruled that although retribution was
no longer a dominant objective of the criminal law, it was
not a forbidden one.2 Then, recognizing there was no convincing empirical evidence supporting or refuting the view
that the death penalty is a greater deterrent to murder than
lesser sanctions, the Court went on to hold that the resolution of this issue should rest with the legislature. 0
With regard to the question of whether death is a
disproportionate sanction, the centrist plurality summarily
concluded that it is an extreme sanction suitable to the most
extreme crimes." Hence the Supreme Court affirmed the
Furman proposition and held for the first time that the
death penalty is not a per se cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.2
The dividing line between the death penalty statutes
of Georgia, Florida and Texas which were upheld in Gregg
and its companion cases and those of North Carolina and
Louisiana which were struck down was in the third prong
of the Court's analysis. The question was whether the sentencing authority received adequate guidance with respect
to various factors surrounding the crime and the defendant
that the state found relevant to the sentencing decision."
This safeguard is intended to minimize the risk that the
death sentence would be rendered in an arbitrary and capricious fashion.8 '
The legislatures of North Carolina and Louisiana incorrectly responded to Furman by stripping the sentencing
authority of all discretion to choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment. 5 Once the defendant was
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 185-88.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 199.
Woodson v. North Carolina, supra note 11, at 301; Roberts v. Louisiana,
supra note 11, at 335.
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convicted of murder, he automatically received the death
sentence. 6 The Court reasoned that, ". . . in capital cases
the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and recof the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense." 7 As such, the idea is not the sentencer's
discretion should be eliminated, but only that it be properly
channelled.
As applied, the sentencing procedures adopted by
Georgia, Florida, and Texas received the Supreme Court's
approval.3 Florida and Georgia took virtually the same
approach. 9 Both sentencing systems provide for a bifurcated
proceeding" at which the sentencing authority is apprised
of information relevant to various statutorily enunciated
aggravating and mitigating factors which are to be weighed
in the determination of whether to impose death or life
imprisonment.4 ' These factors are designed to control the
sentencing authority's discretion and thereby assure that
death sentences are not imposed out of passion, prejudice,
36. 428 U.S. at 286, 329.
37. Woodson v. North Carolnia, supra note 11, at 304.
38. Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11; Proffitt v. Florida, supra note 11;
Jurek v. Texas, supra note 11. The Texas capital punishment statute
required the jury to answer three questions: (1) whether the conduct of
the defendant causing the death was committed deliberately with the
reasonable expectation that death would result; (2) whether it is probable
that the defendant would commit further criminal acts constituting a
threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the defendant's conduct was an unreasonable response to the provocation if any by
the deceased. If all are answered affirmatively the death penalty will be
imposed. Tax. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
39. The Proffitt Court noted that the main difference between the two sentencing systems is that in Florida the judge determines the sentence,
whereas the jury renders the sentence in Georgia. Proffitt v. Florida,
eupra note 11, at 252. The Florida statute also differs from Georgia's in
that it does not require the Supreme Court to conduct any specific form
of review. Id. at 251. The Court ruled, however, that since the trial judge
was required to justify the imposition of capital punishment with written
findings, and since the Florida Supreme Court, like its Georgia counterpart, compares the penalty imposed in the case under review to those in
similar cases, an adequate determination as to whether or not the punishment in a given case is disproprotionate can be made. Id.
40. In a bifurcated proceeding the question of sentence is not considered until
after the verdict of guilty is returned. In the sentencing or penalty phase,
the rules of evidence are relaxed. Evidence which would normally be excluded as irrelevant to the question of guilt is admitted if it bears upon
the issue of punishment, such as, for example, a previous criminal record
of the accused. Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 190-91.
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978); FL. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West
Supp. 1981).
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whim or mistake. 2 An additional precaution inherent in
both systems is the provision for automatic review of all
death sentences by the state supreme court. This requirement is intended to ensure: 1) that each death sentence is
proportional to the sanction imposed for similar crimes;
2) that the evidence supports the findings of any statutory
aggravating circumstances; and 3) that the sentence was
not imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice."4
Tailoring the Statute--Godfrey:
The recent case of Godfrey v. Georgia illustrates that
merely because a death penalty statute is facially valid does
not mean it can be loosely applied. 5 In Godfrey the same
statute which was upheld on its face in Gregg was before
the Court. Unlike Gregg, however, the sentence was reversed
in Godfrey because the Georgia Supreme Court adopted a
broad and vague construction of one of the aggravating
circumstances. 6
The Georgia statute provides that the defendant may be
sentenced to death if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the particular crime "was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.""
The problem in Godfrey was that the jury was not given
adequate instruction as to what these terms meant.4 The
Court held that standing alone, the words "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman," could characterize
almost every murder. 9 Since the narrowing construction
applied in Gregg and subsequent cases5" was abandoned,
the jury's discretion in Godfrey could not be channelled by
clear and objective standards. In its reversal of Mr. Godfrey's death sentence, the Court concluded that capital
42. Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 194-95.
43. Id. at 203; Proffitt v. Florida, supra note 11, at 251.
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (1978); Proffitt v. Florida, supra note 11, at
253, 258-59.
45. Godfrey v. Georgia, supra note 8.
46. Id. at 432-33.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (7) (1978).
48. Godfrey v. Georgia, supra note 8, at 429.
49. Id. at 428-29.
50. Id. at 430-32.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 2, Art. 12

688

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

sentencing procedures must provide a "meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.""1
Consideration of All Mitigating Circumstances-Lockett
and Eddings:
The law of capital punishment was further refined in
Lockett v. Ohio 2 and Eddings v. Oklahoma.5" Lockett struck
down a statute which limited the range of mitigating circumstances to be considered by the sentencing authority.5
Eddings extended this princpile by holding that just as the
statute may not limit mitigating factors, the sentencer
could not limit relevant mitigating factors by refusing to
consider them." The ramifications of Eddings as a practical matter appear to be limited, because although it requires the consideration of all relevant mitigating circumstances, it does not appear to preclude the sentencer from
giving any such circumstances a zero weight in the balancing
process.
WYOMING'S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM

The Wyoming death penalty statute enacted following
Furman imposed a mandatory death penalty upon conviction for first degree murder. 6 It was therefore of the type
held invalid by the U.S. Supreme Court in Woodson and
Roberts." Predictably, this statute was invalidated by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Kennedy v. State." Thereafter, the legislature promptly enacted the sentencing system 9 which was utilized in Hopkinson.
Wyoming's present capital sentencing statutes are modeled after those of Georgia and Florida. All defendants
Id. at 427-28 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, aupra note 6, at 313 (White, J.,
concurring)).
52. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
53. 50 U.S.L.W. 4161 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982).
54. Lockett v. Ohio, supra note 52, at 608.
55. Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra note 53, at 4163-64.
56. WYO. STAT. § 6-54 (1957) (repealed 1977).
57. Woodson v. North Carolina, supra note 11; Roberts v. Louisiana, 8upra
note 11.
58. 559 P.2d 1014 (Wyo. 1977).
59. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -103 (1977).
51.
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convicted of first degree murder must receive either capital
punishment or life imprisonment." A hearing, apart from
the trial, is conducted in which the judge or jury is apprised
of all evidence relevant to the sentencing decision. 1 The
exclusionary rules of evidence do not apply to this sentencing
hearing, except that the defendant is allowed to rebut any
hearsay statements, and he must have been given prior
notice of all evidence tending to establish any aggravating
factors.2 At the conclusion of the hearing the jury is instructed on the existence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances as well as other appropriate matters. 3
Death will not be imposed unless at least one aggravating factor is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 6-4-101(b).
Id. § 6-4-102(a)-(c).
Id. § 6-4-102(c).
Id. § 6-4-102(d). Subsections (h) and (j) of Section 6-4-102 of the Wyoming Statutes provide for mitigating and aggravating circumstances as
follows:
(h) Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following:
(i) The murder was committed by a person under sentence of
imprisonment;
(ii) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder
in the first degree or a felony involving the use or therat
of violence to the person;
(iii) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to
two (2) or more persons;
(iv) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, sexual assault, arson,
burglary, kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful
throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb;
(v) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from
custody;
(vi) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain;
(vii) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel;
(viii) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer,
county attorney, or former county attorney, during or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(j) Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(i) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
activity;
(ii) The murder was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(iii) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act;
(iv) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by
another person and his participation in the homicidal act
was relatively minor;
(v) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person;
(vi) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was substantially impaired;
(vii) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
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this factor or factors outweigh all mitigating circumstances. 4 A jury verdict in favor of capital punishment
must be unanimous and is binding on the judge."' The jury
must designate in writing all aggravating circumstances
which it found." Presumably this allows the appellate court
to conduct a meaningful review. Life imprisonment will
automatically be imposed if the jury cannot agree upon a
verdict within a reasonable time. 7
Every death sentence is automatically reviewed by the
Wyoming Supreme Court.68 The court, inter alia, must consider: 1) whether the death sentence was "imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor; 2) whether the finding of an aggravating circumstance and lack of sufficient mitigating circumstances is
supported by the evidence; and 3) whether the death sentence in the case under review is disproportionate to the
sanction imposed in similar cases. 9
THE WYOMING SUPREME COURT'S
ANALYSIS IN HOPKINSON

Aside from remanding the case for a new sentencing
trial because of misworded jury instructions, 7 the actual
holding of the Hopkinson court with respect to capital
punishment was much more limited than initially appears.
The court held that the death penalty does not per se violate
either the United States or Wyoming Constitutions. 7 Consequently, Wyoming's death penalty statutes are facially
valid. The court did not, however, reach the question,
except in dictum, as to whether Wyoming's death sentencing
system comports with Furman and Gregg which mandate
proper channelling of the sentencing authority's discretion.7
64. Id. § 6-4-102(d) (i) (A),(B), -102(e).
65. Id. § 6-4-102(e) & (f). See also Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 186
(Rose, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part),
66. WYo.STAT. § 6-4-102(e) (1977).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 6-4-103(a).
69. Id. § 6-4-103(d) (i)-(iii).
70. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 169-72; see also supra note 5.
71. Hopknison v. State, supra note 1, at 152.
72. Id. at 153.
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In light of Furman and Gregg, the Hopkinson court
was constrained to find that capital punishment does not
under all circumstances violate the Eighth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. However, the court was free to hold
that the Wyoming Constitution" is more exacting than its
federal counterpart. This it chose not to do."4 Instead, the
court incorporated the analysis of the centrist plurality in
Gregg and ruled that "a rigorous examination of a sentence
of death, conducted in accord with Furman and Gregg will
satisfy both the U.S. and the Wyoming constitutional requirements."7 In sum, the death penalty in Wyoming is not
per se unconstitutional, because it is consistent with contemporary values and in accordance with "the dignity of
man" concept.7"
The issue of whether the death sentencing statutes were
properly applied at the trial level in Hopkinson was not
decided. Nevertheless, the court did construe various provisions of the statutes in order to facilitate their application
in the future. As demonstrated by Godfrey and Lockett,
the particular construction and application given these statutory provisions is critical. Therefore, the guidelines provided by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Hopkinson should
be given as much credence at the trial level as are the
actual statutes.
Of particular concern was Section 6-4-102(h) (vii) of
the Wyoming Statutes which lists as an aggravating circumstance a murder which is "especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel.""7 Almost any murder would seem to fall within
this classification. Thus, contrary to the teachings of Furman
and Godfrey, an open-ended definition of "especially heinous,
atrocoius or cruel" would seem to give the judge or jury
free rein to impose the death penalty. Cognizant of this
problem, the court narrowly construed these words. The
73. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14. "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted." Id.
74. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 152.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 151-52.
77. Id. at 153-54; WYo. STAT. § 6-4-102(h) (vii) (1977).
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construction was broken into a definition of "especially
heinous" and "especially atrocious or cruel.""8 The court
concluded that a murder is "especially heinous" if "the consciencelessness of the defendant is not only an outrage but
also a dangerous and unrestrainable threat to society."' 7"
Elaborating further, the court noted that the term was
applicable in cases where the defendant "not only may, but
probably will, kill again."8 °
Difficult problems of proof will have to be overcome by
any prosecutor attempting to establish that a given murder
is "especially heinous." The statutory procedures require
that all aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt." The burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that a given defendant probably will kill again
seems insurmountable.
As to the term "especially atrocious or cruel", the court
embraced the definition set out by the Supreme Court of
Florida in State v. Dixon." There the phrase was construed
to refer only to "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim."8 3 This definition
is safe because it received the Supreme Court's approval in
Proffitt v. Florida.4
By dividing the words "especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel" into two terms the court effectively created two
aggravating circumstances. The sentencing procedures require the jury to indicate in writing any existing aggravating circumstances which they find.85 As previously noted,
this provides a basis for meaningful review of the death
sentence by the supreme court. It is therefore, advisable for
trial courts to have the jury separately indicate which, if
either, of these circumstances they found.
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 153-54.
Id.
Id. at 154.
WYO. STAT. § 6-4-102(e) (1977).
283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 154 (quoting Proffitt v. Florida,
supra note 11, at 255 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1979)).
84. Proffitt v. Florida, supra note 11, at 255-56.
85. WYo. STAT. § 6-4-102(e) (1977).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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The Hopkinson court also clarified the meaning of
Section 6-4-102(j) of the Wyoming Statutes which states
"Mitigating circumstances shall be the following [seven
specified instances]."86 Hopkinson contended this denigrated

Lockett, because it prohibited the sentencer from considering
any relevant but unlisted mitigating factors." Rejecting this
argument, the court determined the statute allows all relevant mitigating factors to be deliberated."8
Another Hopkinson guideline is that the jury should
not be given the option of finding aggravating circumstances
for which no evidence has been offered. " At Hopkinson's
trial, the jury was instructed as to the existence of the
fourth aggravating circumstance as follows:
The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit, any
robbery, rape, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device
or bomb.90
The court found that it was error to so instruct the jury,
because the prosecution presented no evidence tending to
show any of the crimes listed in this aggravating factor."'
The final caveat is that "what may be harmless error
in a case with less at stake becomes reversible error when
the penalty is death.""2 Hopkinson's death penalty was remanded because the jury was instructed that an aggravating circumstance would exist if, "at the time of the murders:
The Defendant was previously convicted of another
murder in the first degree or a felony involving the use or
86. Id. § 6-4-102(j).
87. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 156-57.
88. Id. at 157. In future cases, trial courts should also comply with Eddings v.
Oklahoma, supra note 53, at 4163-64, which requires the sentencer to at
least consider all relevant mitigating circumstances. See also discussion on
Eddings, supra notes in text accompanying notes 53 & 55.
89. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 166. Presumably this principle would
apply to any situation where reasonable minds could not disagree that a
given mitigating circumstance did not exist.
90. Id. at 166-67.
91. Id.
92. Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d 1360, 1363 (Miss. 1978).
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threat of violence to the person." 3 Even though the Green
murder was subsequent to the Vehar murders, the jury
found this aggravating circumstance applicable with respect
to Green. 4 Curiously, the court reasoned that if the language "at the time of the murders" had been excluded from
the instruction there would have been no error." Citing the
Florida case of Lucas v. State, 6 the court concluded that
the words "previously convicted of another murder" could
properly refer to convictions entered contemporaneously in
the same prosecution in which the jury has recommended
the death penalty. 7
Since prior to his trial, Hopkinson had not been convicted of murder or a felony involving the threat of violence
to a person, it seems clear that the jury was thinking of the
Vehar murders when it decided that this aggravating circumstance existed. It is therefore probable that if the instructions had been properly worded the jury would have
reached the same result. Nevertheless, the court found the
misworded instruction to be reversible error.9" The moral is
that the trial court must exercise extreme caution to avoid
all error in the sentencing phase of the trial.
THE TEST OF WHETHER CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS
PER SE UNCONSTITUTIONAL-MEANINGFUL OR

EMPTY RHETORIC?

When called upon to determine the constitutionality of
capital punishment, the U.S. Supreme Court had the formidable task of grappling with one of the most controversial
legal and moral issues of our time. The Court has fractured
on virtually every such case it has decided. As a result, only
three justices have formulated most of the law with respect
to the validity of the death penalty under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 167 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 171.
376 So. 2d 1149, 1152-53 (Fla. 1979).
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 171.
Id. at 170-72.
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The job of each state's supreme court to pass on the
acceptability of the death penalty in light of its respective
constitution should be no less demanding than that of its
federal counterpart. The rationale of the U.S. Supreme Court
should be carefully examined before it is subscribed to on
the state level. Further, the state courts should consider
whether the drafters intended for state constitutional provisions to be more exacting than corresponding federal provisions, especially when they vary in form and wording."
Assessing the U.S. Supreme Court's Test of Per Se Unconstitutionality:
As with many areas of constitutional law, the selection
of a particular test to be applied by the Court in a specific
context is often determinative of the uotcome of a case. This
is also true in regard to the determination of whether the
death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
The centrist plurality in Gregg starts from the premise that
any punishment selected by a legislature should be presumed valid.0 0 Accordingly, to overcome the presumption,
the defendant must sustain the "heavy burden"'' of providing either that his sentence of death is not in accord with
contemporary values, or that capital punishment does not
comport with the basic concept of "the dignity of man."'0 2
Under the analysis of the centrist plurality, any effort
to show that capital punishment is inconsistent with contemporary values is futile. The fact that the majority of
legislatures have authorized capital punishment not only
serves to shift the burden of proof to the defendant, but
also helps to convince these justices that our society finds
this sanction acceptable." 3 Legislative judgment, however,
was said not to be the only objective indicia of contemporary
99. For an excellent discussion and analysis on the difference between the
United States and Wyoming Constitutions with respect to the death penalty,
see Hopkinson v. State, sup-ra note 1, at 199-215 (Rose, C.J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
100. Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 175.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 173-75.
103. Id. at 179-81.
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values." 4 Juries were also said to be a reliable index of
societal mores." 5 The plurality concluded that the "relative
infrequency" of jury-imposed death sentences as opposed to
life imprisonment does not reflect society's rejection of
capital punishment per se."' s Instead, it was thought this
might reflect the notion that capital punishment should be
reserved for the most extreme cases, and that the actions
of juries in many states since Furman are compatible with
the legislative judgments.0 7 The flaw in this reasoning is
that only those veniremen whose views are consistent with
the legislature are allowed to sit on the jury."' Any prospective juror who believes the death penalty should not be
imposed in any situation will be successfully challenged for
cause on the ground that he cannot enforce the law of the
state. ' 9 Consequently, the judgment of the legislature effectively nullifies the reliability of the jury as an objective
index of contemporary values.
The defendant will find the second prong of the test,
involving the dignity of man concept, an equally frustrating
obstacle. A penalty does not comport with the fundamental
notion of the dignity of man if it is excessive." Much to the
defendant's distress, however, is that even if he proves life
imprisonment will satisfy the ends of penology, his life will
not be spared."' He must show that death is "so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering."" 2
Retribution and deterrence were suggested by the Gregg
plurality to be two principal purposes served by capital
punishment."' The centrist plurality offered the following
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.
In Hopkinson, two prospective jurors were successfully challenged for
cause because, contrary to the judgment of the legislature, they believed
the death penalty should not be imposed under any circumstances. Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 157-60.
See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Hopkinson v. State,
supra note 1, at 157-60; WYo. STAT. § 7-11-105 (1977).
Hopkinson v. State, supra note 1, at 151.
Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 182-83.
Id. at 183.
Id. Without any elaboration, the centrist plurality stated in a footnote:
"Another purpose that has been discussed is the incapacitation of danger-
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explanation of the retributive justification for the death
penalty:
The instinct for retribution is part of the
nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a
society governed by law. When people begin to
believe that organized society is unwilling or unable
to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they "deserve" then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy-of
self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch
1 14
law.

The problem with this analysis is that there was absolutely
no evidence presented in Gregg that the imposition of life
imprisonment instead of the death penalty promotes anarchy,
self-help, vigilante justice or lynch law.1 '
The other principal purpose said to be served by capital
punishment is deterrence.1" Justices Stewart, Powell and
Stevens"' ruled that they assumed that capital punishment
was a significant deterrent to many murders even though
no empirical evidence either supported or refuted this
view."' They further concluded that legislatures were the
appropriate body to resolve the issue of whether capital
punishment has any value as a deterrent."'
In sum, with respect to the inquiry as to whether
capital punishment is in accord with contemporary values,
the defendant finds himself playing a game of "heads you
win, tails I lose." The enactment of the death penalty statutes by the defendant's own state, along with 34 others,
not only shifts to the defendant the burden of showing the
sanction is clearly inconsistent with societal values,'20 but
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

ous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future." Id. at 183 n.28.
Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 183 (citing Furman v. Georgia, supra
note 6, at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) ).
Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 238 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 183.
The centrist plurality.
Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 179-81.
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also serves to conclusively settle the question. He faces an
equally hopeless situation in his attempt to show that capital
punishment is excessive. First, there seems to be no way
to refute the unsubstantiated view that capital punishment
must be imposed in order to prevent the "seeds of anarchy"
from being sown. "1 Second, since the proposition that the
death penalty is an effective deterrent cannot be proven or
disproven, he will necessarily lose on this issue as well. 22
Proposed New Test
The Hopkinson court adequately followed the mandates
of Furman and its progeny in arriving at the conclusion
that capital punishment is equally permissible under the
Wyoming Constitution. Consequently, the court cannot be
criticized. The analysis applied by the U.S. Supreme Court
to federal constitutional questions should be accorded considerable weight when identical issues are being reviewed
under the state constitution. In striking out on its own, a
state court runs the risk of setting uncertain and sometimes
undesirable precedent.'23 With respect to capital punishment,
however, it appears as though both courts have overlooked
the constitutional test applied to similar issues. It is the
author's opinion that the right to life is fundamental under
the substantive aspect of the due process clause, and as such,
any legislative attempt to infringe upon that right should
be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny under both the Wyoming and U.S. Constitutions. "4
Currently, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, the right to life is only protected by
procedural due process. Under this aspect of due process,
an individual facing a death sentence is guaranteed a fair
procedure to determine whether the defendant is in fact
121. See id. at 183.
122. See id. at 185-86. As previously discussed, the analysis of "excessiveness"
under the Eighth Amendment also involves an inquiry into whether the
given sanction is disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is
imposed. Id at 187. The Gregg Court summarily concluded that death is
not a disproportionate penalty for the most severe crime. Id. Thus, defendant's problem of having an insurmountable burden of proof would be
equally applicable with respect to disproportionality.
123. Comment, Wyoming's Equal Protection Clause Mandates Fiscal Neutrality
in School Funding, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 691, 698-704 (1981).
124. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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guilty of a crime punishable by death. Procedural due process does not, however, provide inquiry into the state's
authority to terminate a person's life. Hence, under the
current state of the law, the defendant has no legal cause
to complain if he has received a fair proceeding (and the
mandates of Furman and its progeny are satisfied).
Substantive due process, as opposed to procedural due
process, focuses on the substance of the legislation itself.
Under substantive due process analysis, the U.S. Supreme
Court strictly scrutinizes statutes which impinge upon, inter
alia, the fundamental rights of association,'
privacy, 2 '
and freedom of worship.?
While the freedoms of worship, association and privacy are basic constitutional rights, they certainly do not
warrant greater protection than the right to life. As stated
by Justice Brennan, "An executed person has indeed 'lost
the right to have rights.' ,,12. When viewed against this
backdrop it seems clear fhat any legislative effort to terminate the fundamental right to life should be subjected to
at least the same degree of judicial scrutiny that is imposed
upon other statutes which threaten other fundamental rights.
Under heightened judicial scrutiny, state-imposed death
would be allowed only where it was necessary to achieve a
compelling state purpose for which there were no less drastic
alternatives.'
The state's duty to administer a criminal
justice system is clearly a compelling state purpose. Moreover, the crime of murder is deserving of a very severe
penalty. The state should bear the burden of proving, how125. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-64 (1973).
127. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). In Cantwell, the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed a statute which conditioned the right to solicit
money for religious purposes upon approval of a state official who was
required to determine whether the applicant's cause was in fact religious.
Id. at 301-02. The Court concluded that the statute burdened the fundamental right to freely exercise religion and accordingly invoked heightened
scrutiny. Id. at 303. The state had a permissible interest in protecting the
public from fraudulent solicitation, and this statute apparently served
that end. Id. at 306-07. However, the statute was struck down, because it
was not narrowly drawn and less onerous alternatives were available. Id.
128. Furman v. Georgia, supra note 6, at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 127, at 303-07.
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ever, that no less severe penalty than state-imposed death
will adequately serve the ends of penology. 110
Under the test proposed here, there would no longer
be an issue of whether capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. Further, it would not be necessary to determine whether the sentencing body's discretion had been
properly channelled so as to avoid the capricious and arbitrary imposition of capital punishment. The only question
that need be answered is whether the state fulfilled its
burden of proving that it has no alternative but to terminate
the defendant's fundamental right to life in order to fulfill
the ends of penology.
The author would be less than candid if he contended
that this test would not drastically reduce the number of
death sentences being upheld. It seems, however, that in
order for our Constitution to have true meaning, it must be
basically consistent with respect to fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION

In Hopkinson v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court
found that the death penalty was not unconstitutional under
all circumstances. In so doing, it held that Wyoming's Constitution is no more exacting with respect to capital punishment than its federal counterpart. The court did not decide
whether the trial court properly applied Wyoming's capital
sentencing statutes so as to adequately channel the jury's
130. If strict scrutiny under substantive due process is applied to capital punishment statutes, it does not necessarily follow that statutes depriving an
individual of liberty or property (such as statutes imposing jail sentences
for crimes or authorizing eminent domain) will have to be accorded the
same treatment. Currently, under due process analysis an individual is only
guaranteed a fair proceeding before he can be deprived of life, liberty and
property. The author submits that the fundamental right of life is the only
one of these three rights that need be subjected to heightened scrutiny
under substantive due process principles; In Gregg v.: Georgia, the Court
held that death sentences should be examined more rigorously than other
criminal sanctions. Gregg v. Georgia, supra note 11, at 204-05. The Court
clearly drew this distinction because capital punishment was qualitatively
different from even a sentence. of life imprisonment. In his .concurring
opinion in Furman, Justice Stewart aptly stated, "[capital punishment] is
unique . . . in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity." Furman v.. Georgia, supra note 6 at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). This same reasoning justifies singling out death- sentencing
statutes, as opposed to statutes involving deprivation of liberty and property issues, for heightened judicial review uider substantive due process
analysis.
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discretion and avoid the arbitrary and capricious imposition
of the death penalty. Several guidelines were set out in
dictum, however, for the purpose of facilitating the proper
application of these statutes in the future.
The Wyoming and U.S. Supreme Courts presume the
facial validity of death penalty statutes. Hence the defendant must sustain the burden of proving that the legislative
judgment in favor of capital punishment is clearly wrong.
Since the right to continue living is unquestionably a fundamental right of all persons, the judicial deference given
to statutes which allow the termination of this right in any
instance is drastically inconsistent with the treatment given
statutes which infringe upon judicially defined fundamental
rights under substantive due process analysis. The holding
in any given case involving constitutional issues is often
dictated by the particular test applied. Consequently, conflicting result oriented tests should not be used to assess the
propriety of any state actions which infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights.
JOHN R. MAXFIELD
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